Iraq tries to assert state authority during crisis

The Iraqi government has long navigated a path between maintaining political ties with its Iranian neighbor and Tehran’s allies inside Iraq on the one hand, and preserving its security relationship with the United States on the other. Unsurprisingly, it quickly welcomed US President Donald Trump’s June 23 Israel-Iran cease-fire agreement. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ statement highlighted that the agreement was a “positive step to reduce escalation and strengthen stability.” Although the ministry’s response was in reference to regional de-escalation and stability, it could also be interpreted as applying to Iraq itself, in that the government in Baghdad is trying to restrain pro-Iran militias while also attempting to contain economic challenges from the Israel-Iran war and perennial disputes with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Erbil.

Iraqi political spectrum unified in condemning Israeli attacks

The Iraqi government quickly condemned Israel’s initial strikes against Iran on June 12/13, calling the attack “a blatant violation of international law and an act of aggression.” The declaration came just after Prime Minister Mohammed Shiaa al-Sudani’s urgent meeting with the US embassy chargé d’affaires and the American major general commanding the international coalition forces deployed in Iraq. A variety of Iraqi politicians and Shi’a religious figures also vehemently spoke out against the Israeli attack. Most notable was the prompt statement from the office of the influential Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani that labeled the Israeli attack a crime and echoed the prime minister’s call for the international community to intervene and stop Israel’s strikes on Iran. Even the KRG’s president publicly denounced the attacks, labeling them a threat to regional stability and calling for the international community to act to stop the hostilities. The Shi’a Islamist hold on the federal government in Baghdad, combined with Iranian influence among Iraqi leaders, necessitated a strong public censure of the Israeli strikes, but the Iraqi military’s own weakness makes any state action beyond verbal condemnation difficult.

Sharp rebukes notwithstanding, the Iraqi government in Baghdad and the KRG in Erbil additionally emphasized that they did not want the country pulled into the war. Both urged de-escalation in the confrontation and insisted that the warring parties not use Iraqi territory or airspace in their operations. Iraqi Kurdish authorities specifically worried about the potential for large-scale Iranian attacks against American military forces deployed at the airbase in Harir City, about 20 miles northeast of Erbil, and deployed extra Peshmerga protection.

A particularly sensitive issue for Baghdad during the Israel-Iran confrontation was the constant violation of Iraqi airspace by both sides, though the bulk of its criticism was leveled at Israel. Iraqi politicians, including the prime minister and parliamentarians, along with militia officials and civil society figures all angrily condemned the Israeli overflights. Iraq’s foreign ministry presented an urgent, formal complaint on June 13 to the United Nations Security Council about Israeli aircraft and missiles using Iraqi airspace. Sudani also raised the violations in his meetings with American and British diplomats, according to Iraqi media. On June 14, the Iraqi Armed Forces spokesperson stated that the bilateral Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) between Washington and Baghdad obliges the US to prevent Israeli violations of Iraqi airspace. According to Shafaq News, Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister Hussein Bahr al-Uloom — no bombastic opponent of the United States — stressed to the senior American diplomat in Baghdad June 21 that repeated Israeli violations of Iraqi airspace “not only undermine Iraqi sovereignty but also threaten civil aviation safety.” He emphasized the insult of Israeli overflights of southern Iraqi cities and the risk to operations at Basra International Airport, the only airport in the country not closed by the Iraqi Ministry of Transportation in response to the outbreak of hostilities.

That Iraqi stance was apparently not exclusively homegrown: the Iranians notably also pressed Baghdad to try to stop the Israeli overflights of Iraq enroute to hitting targets in Iran, a point Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian raised publicly on June 16. Unsurprisingly, nothing was heard from Iraqi officials about Iran’s repeated violations of Iraqi airspace during its retaliatory strikes. Baghdad fears that Israeli (and American) strikes that fly over Iraq may trigger Iranian responses that also utilize Iraqi airspace, thus jeopardizing Iraqi efforts to stay out of the fighting and undermining its own security.

Cognizant of its critical security vulnerability, Baghdad is buying South Korean air-defense batteries; but these will not begin arriving for months, Iraq’s defense minister told the media on June 19. In the meantime, the federal government is pondering how to effectively leverage the SFA to secure American pressure on Israel to stop using Iraqi airspace.

Iran and allied militias calculate carefully

Frictions over Israel and the strikes on Iran aside, neither Baghdad nor the KRG want their relations with the United States to suffer as a result of this crisis. The Iraqi government quietly but firmly urged pro-Iran militias in Iraq not to shoot missiles at Israel. According to the well-informed newspaper Al Mada on June 22, Iraqi security forces did not allow protesters to come near the American embassy in Baghdad. Sobered by an initial withdrawal of non-essential staff from the diplomatic mission, the Iraqi government passed a stern warning to the pro-Iran militias to avoid targeting Americans. It is worth noting that while Prime Minister Sudani spoke on June 23 with Russian President Vladimir Putin about the crisis, the Baghdad government has not reported any similar such contacts with high-level officials in Washington; he has instead resorted to communicating with working-level staff at the American embassy. Baghdad wants sustained US support for its security forces, especially as it considers the aftermath of the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government in neighboring Syria and the potential revival of Sunni extremists there. The Shi’a Islamists who form the backbone of Sudani’s government also want to maintain a security relationship with Washington — but at the same time, they wish to forestall any American move to violently smash the Iran-backed militias.

It is important to note that the militias are listening to the Shi’a Islamist politicians’ calls for restraint. Despite past warnings that they would retaliate against the United States and Israel if either party attacked Iran, these pro-Iran armed groups, which call themselves the “Iraqi Resistance,” have limited their response to verbal condemnations of the Israeli attacks. And they notably have not directly condemned the American attack of June 21. Al Mada reported on June 24 that Farid al-Jazai’iri from the political office of one of the most important militias, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, asserted in a television interview that the fighting was “a war of technology” and that so far Iran had not needed military support from the Iraqi Resistance. With greater honesty, Mahdi al-Ka’abi from the important Nujaba militia said in another televised appearance that intervening in the fighting would require “careful calculations, not emotion.” Ka’abi noted that defending Iran was a “legitimate duty, and there are great Iraqi interests to protect,” adding that Iran would decide whether to strike American targets in Iraq, Jordan, and the Gulf. He also indicated awareness of debates inside the United States, pointing to fears in Congress that there are 40,000 American “hostages” — US personnel based in the Middle East — at the mercy of Iranian missiles. An Iraqi analyst and professor of international relations and strategy at the University of Baghdad, Ihsan Shamari, told Al Mada the militias understand that attacking Americans would be suicidal and also trigger retaliatory American strikes across Iran. He opined that the militias’ calculations would change if further strikes threatened the survival of the Iranian regime or if the militias were hit directly. So far, there is no sign Tehran is urging the militias to shoot at the Americans or Israel.

The oil angle

Iraq’s petroleum sector is another reason Baghdad and Erbil want the crisis to recede. Oil exports account for almost all of Iraq’s export earnings and over 80% of the government’s budget revenues. Iranian actions to disrupt tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz for a sustained period would directly threaten Iraq’s economy. Moreover, after Israel began attacking Iranian targets, major energy companies, including BP, ENI, and Total, evacuated most of their expatriates working in the southern oilfields of Iraq, the country’s biggest. The state-owned Basra Oil Company issued a statement on June 23 claiming oil production levels were unaffected, and many expatriates continued their work with Iraqi staff remotely. Chinese and Russian companies also operate in the southern oilfields, but the impact of the fighting on their nationals was unclear. Meanwhile, the government’s closure of most of Iraq’s airspace between June 13 and 26 stranded Iraqi and foreign travelers and cost the government overflight fees from airlines crossing over Iraq. Baghdad thus had solid economic reasons to support a prompt de-escalation in the fighting.

Looking ahead

The current crisis arose as the federal government in Baghdad and the Kurdish region’s government were grappling with other pressing domestic problems. The perennial dispute about oil exports and revenues deadlocked again in February, this time over Baghdad’s move to halt funds to pay the salaries of the KRG’s civil servants. The issue would normally go to the federal Supreme Court, but that body is in disarray following the resignation of nine of its judges who complained of political interference in their work. The Supreme Court must also certify the results of the upcoming November parliamentary elections, out of which a new government should be formed. Iraqi leaders will, thus, be preoccupied with their own domestic problems while they watch developments between Israel and Iran carefully.

Absent an agreement between Israel, the US, and Iran about the latter’s remaining nuclear program, more fighting is likely, and Iraq’s tone regarding Israel will remain sharp. The Iraqi government regularly refers to “the Zionist entity” and “Zionist aggression.” Prime Minister Sudani reiterated in an interview with Sky News on May 15 that Iraq would not normalize relations with Israel. A 2022 law forbids contacts between Iraqi citizens and Israel; and some Iraqi politicians accuse the authorities of overlooking oil exported from Iraqi Kurdistan through Turkey to Israel. Thus, even if the cease-fire between Israel and Iran proves durable, Iraq will be unlikely to join any near-term moves by other Arab states to normalize relations with Israel.

 

Robert S. Ford is a Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow at MEI.

Photo by Thaier Al-Sudani/Reuters/Pool/Anadolu via Getty Images